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Abstract 
 
Does it matter whether research is conducted by the private business rather than in 
universities or government research centres? While most of the attention of science and 
innovation policy in the last decades has explored the relevance of the interconnections 
between public and business players in enhancing knowledge-based societies, a major trend 
has been ignored: both the quota of public R&D and its share over the total R&D investment 
has shrunk in most OECD countries. As a result, a larger fraction of knowledge is today 
generated in the private sector. We argue that this is a major problem since public research 
and private research differ along a number of characteristics, e.g. public access, potential for 
future technological innovations, criteria of resource allocation. This trend can have adverse 
implications for long-term innovation and economic welfare in our societies. Through the 
lens of the public goods theory and of the sector of funding and execution of R&D for the 
period 1981-2012 we try to explain why. 
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1. Introduction: the shift from public R&D to business R&D 
In the last decades a major attack has been directed against the public sector. Everything 
labelled public – from hospitals to drinking fountains, from airports to motorways – has been 
described as inefficient, costly and ultimately useless. This is hardly a solely intellectual 
fashion; it is strictly associated to an attempt to move as many as possible of these public 
infrastructures and their associated economic value to the profit-seeking sector. There have 
been important economic consequences: public expenditure has been reduced while many 
public utilities – from trains to telephones – have been privatised. This trend can be observed 
in virtually all advanced countries (see Megginson and Netter, 2001). 
The realm of knowledge has not been immune from this overall mood. While governments 
and the business community continuously recognize the importance of knowledge and 
innovation as crucial components of economic development and human welfare, there has 
been a long-term trend to belittle the contribution of public institutions and to glorify the 
virtuous of business investment (see the enthusiastic call for the downsizing of public R&D 
by Kealey, 1996; and the critical rejoinder by David, 1997). This is reflected in the most 
visible and measurable component of knowledge creation, namely the resources devoted to 
Research and Development (R&D). Figures 1 and 2 report the data for, respectively, industry 
and government financed R&D. In most OECD countries a significant shift in the effort to 
finance public R&D has occurred: from 1981 to 2013 the share of public-financed R&D to 
GDP has been reduced from 0.82 per cent to 0.67 per cent. By contrast, the industry-financed 
R&D has increased from 0.96 per cent of GDP in 1981 to 1.44 per cent in 2013 (see also 
Table 1). There are significant differences across countries. Japan and South Korea exhibit a 
virtuous trend where both the business and the government have increased their own R&D 
expenditure; in South Korea, particularly, the government expenditure increase has been 
spectacular. In the US, the UK, Canada, France and Germany, by contrast, we assist 
simultaneously to the growth of industry-financed R&D and to the decline of government-
financed R&D. The temporary slowdown in Germany can be attributed to the unification of 
1989, while for the UK it has to be noted that a larger fraction of private-financed R&D come 
from foreign sources and therefore it is not accounted for in these figures (see note on Table 
2). 
Table 1 
Gross R&D (GERD) expenditure as a percentage of GDP by source of funds (G-7 countries plus 
South Korea and OECD average), rate of change 1981-2013 
  
Industry-financed GERD as a 
percentage of GDP   
Government-financed GERD as a 
percentage of GDP 
   rate of change 1981-2013    rate of change 1981-2013 
Canada   53.06%    -6.56% 
France   63.16%    -21.21% 
Germany   38.81%    -13.27% 
Italy   33.33%    38.46% 
Japan   85.82%    15.38% 
South Korea*   86.90%    126.19% 
United Kingdom   -19.15%    -59.26% 
United States   48.21%    -29.63% 
OECD - Total   50.00%    -18.29% 
Source: OECD Main Science and Technology Indicators (MSTI). 
Note: Data for South Korea refer to 1995 instead of 1981. 
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Fig. 1 
Industry-financed GERD as a percentage of GDP, 1981-2013 (selected countries) 
 
 
 
Source: Elaboration on OECD Main Science and Technology Indicators (MSTI). 
 
The consequence on the composition of R&D is remarkable (Table 2). On the one hand, the 
percentage of gross expenditure of R&D financed by the government has, in the OECD, 
shrunk from 44.2 per cent in 1981 to 28.3 per cent in 2013. The drop has been considerable in 
every country, particularly in the UK and in the US, while South Korea represents the only 
exception. On the other hand, the percentage of gross expenditure financed by industry has 
increased from 51.6 per cent of 1981 to 60.8 per cent of 2013. The increase is particularly 
strong in the US, Germany, and the UK. These trends show a clear structural change: the 
business sector is becoming more and more important in knowledge creation, while the 
public sector is slowly retracting (on this trend see also Conceicao et al., 2004; Dinges et al., 
2007; Van Pottelsberghe De La Potterie, 2008). 
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Fig. 2 
Government-financed GERD as a percentage of GDP, 1981-2013 (selected countries) 
 
 
 
Source: Elaboration on OECD Main Science and Technology Indicators (MSTI). 
Most of the attention of science and innovation policy in the last decades has been directed 
towards the relevance of the interconnections between universities, industry and the 
governments (as in the Triple Helix view) (Colombo et al., 2011; Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff, 
2000; Lawton Smith and Bagchi-Sen, 2010; Sarpong et al., 2015), and the major institutional 
transformations that have followed in the production of knowledge (exemplified in the Mode 
2 knowledge production) (Gibbons et al., 1994). University-industry linkages have become 
imperative and ubiquitous in the political agenda as a means to boost technology transfer and 
for improving training in skills required by the industry (D’Este et al., 2013; Gander, 1986; 
Hsu et al., 2015; Perkmann et al., 2013). Much less concern has been devoted to the overall 
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shrinking of public research and to its main effect on innovation, long-term economic growth 
and social welfare (Conceicao et al., 2004).
1
 
Table 2 
Percentage of Gross R&D (GERD) expenditure by source of funds (G-7 countries plus South Korea 
countries and OECD average) 
 
  
Percentage of GERD financed by 
industry   
Percentage of GERD financed by 
government 
year 1981 2013 rate of change  1981 2013 rate of change 
Canada 40.77 46.45 13.93%  50.61 34.86 -31.12% 
France 40.92 55.38 35.34%  53.4 34.97 -34.51% 
Germany 56.85 65.21 14.71%  41.79 29.78 -28.74% 
Italy 50.08 44.29 -11.56%  47.21 42.55 -9.87% 
Japan 67.71 75.48 11.48%  24.91 17.30 -30.55% 
South Korea* 76.26 75.68 -0.76%  19.04 22.83 19.91% 
United Kingdom 42.05 46.55 (70)* 10.70%  48.1 26.99 -43.89% 
United States 49.41 60.85 23.15%  47.8 27.75 -41.95% 
OECD - Total 51.64 60.76 17.66%   44.19 28.28 -36.00% 
Source: OECD Main Science and Technology Indicators (MSTI). Data for South Korea refer to 1995 instead of 
1981; the sum of the shares does not add up to 100% since there are other minor sources that are not considered, 
namely “other national sources” and “abroad”. In the UK a significant higher proportion of R&D funding comes 
from overseas. When this is taken into account the share of private-funded R&D stands at 70% (Economic 
Insight, 2015, p. 7). 
 
The so often anticipated knowledge economy is on its way, at least judging from the 
resources devoted to R&D and other scientific, technological and engineering activities, but 
the profit seeking sector is gaining positions at the expenses of the public sector. Is this a 
problem? Two optimist arguments support the view that this is not such a trouble. The first 
states that this is irrelevant provided that new knowledge is generated. The important thing is 
that we know more things and we invest enough resources for it while it is less relevant if 
new discoveries and inventions are made by public or business players. The second is that the 
private sector is more efficient than the public sector, and research carried out in the latter has 
greater impact on business innovation performance and on countries’ competitiveness. If the 
business sector proves to be more efficient in the way it generates knowledge, there is no 
reason why this should be kept within the public sector. Therefore, our research question is: 
does it matter whether research is conducted in universities or government research centres, 
rather than by the private business? 
 
We will argue that the so often applauded current privatisation of research activity and 
knowledge (see Kealey, 1996; Ridley, 2015) can have major consequences on innovation 
and, ultimately, on long-term economic growth and social welfare.
2
 One of the central 
reasons why the threat to knowledge augmenting is largely ignored or under-estimated is 
associated to an unclear understanding of the economic characteristics of knowledge. In this 
paper we first develop an analysis of the differences between knowledge generated in the 
public sector and knowledge generated in the private sector. On the ground of data on R&D 
expenditure in OECD countries we discuss a number of implications for innovation and 
                                                          
1
 For a recent array of contributions on science and technology policy see Crespi and Quatraro (2013) and the 
related special issue on Systemic technology policies: Issues and instruments. 
2
 For opinions which goes against the stream see Mazzuccato (2013) and M.I.T. (2015). 
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science policy. We will argue that it does matter where knowledge is produced: knowledge 
produced in the public sector has very different economic characteristics compared to 
knowledge produced in the business sector. When this is taken into account, the change in the 
composition between public and private research has consequences for the current and future 
pace of technological innovation and long-term economic growth. 
 
This paper is related to a broad discussion which is taking place both in the academy and in 
policy circles: is science, thought its application to technological innovation, an essential 
engine of long-term economic growth? (Deiaco et al., 2012; Havas, 2008). The emergence of 
a new institutional reconfiguration of universities, as increasingly nested into the economic 
production process along with the industry and the government has been described as a major 
break in the production of knowledge, as in the “Mode 2” (Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff, 2000) 
or as an emerging system in which public and private institutions tend to overlap, as in the 
“Triple Helix” view (Leydesdorff and Etzkowitz, 1996). According to these scholars, these 
major changes have basically blurred the functional differentiation between science and 
markets, and that between public and private (Leydesdorff and Etzkowitz, 1996).  
 
A recent contribution by Mariana Mazzucato has re-fuelled the debate about the role that the 
state, through investment in basic science, has played for technological development in the 
industry, somehow restating the value of the linear model of innovation (Balconi et al., 2010; 
Godin, 2006). We are therefore addressing the much heated debate about the economic 
relevance of the public funding of science. On the one hand, scientists have been concerned 
in recent years not only about the downsizing of funding for public research, but also that 
governments “have been overemphasizing ‘translational research’ (e.g. research intended to 
result in a product or the improvement of a product) at the expense of basic research” (Orac, 
2015). On the other hand there are those attacking, in fact, the basis of the linear model of 
innovation – or better the ‘vulgar science-push’ version of it (David, 1997) - as we can read 
from an influential editorial that appeared on the Wall Street Journal: “Politicians believe that 
innovation can be turned on and off like a tap: You start with pure scientific insights, which 
then get translated into applied science, which in turn become useful technology. So what you 
must do, as a patriotic legislator, is to ensure that there is a ready supply of money to 
scientists on the top floor of their ivory towers, and lo and behold, technology will come 
clanking out of the pipe at the bottom of the tower” (Ridley, 2015). In brief, this debate 
opposes those arguing that government-funded basic research is an idle path toward 
innovations and that the market can do it better, to others countering that publicly-funded 
research provides benefits which cannot be substituted by private research. In the end, the 
debate seems to boil down to differences in opinion about how much science should be 
publicly or privately funded. This is what we are concerned about in this paper. 
 
In the next section we develop our analytical distinction about public-generated and private-
generated knowledge. In the third section we analyse data on public and private R&D. 
Section four puts forward some implications of our findings, while section five discusses our 
results in relation to the research in this field and concludes. 
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2. Beyond the knowledge-as-a-Public-Good view: an analytical framework 
of public-generated knowledge and private-generated knowledge 
 
For many years knowledge has been considered to be a public good. Economics Nobel Prize 
winner Kenneth Arrow (1962) contributed to disseminate this view in one of the most cited 
articles in the economics of innovation, arguing that knowledge is costly to produce but could 
be disseminated as information at zero or very low costs. This view is rather persistent if it 
was re-stated by another authoritative Nobel Prize winner such as Joseph Stiglitz (1999). This 
view has been developed within the classic welfare economics perspective in which the 
public-good characteristics of knowledge lead to under-investment in the private sector, a 
market failure which could be solved either by assigning (intellectual) property rights to the 
inventor or with the intervention of the public sector (Arrow 1962. For a review, see 
Archibugi and Filippetti, 2015b).  
 
While that theory addressed the problem of the optimal level of the production of knowledge, 
it did not consider the problem of the diffusion of knowledge. This is consistent with the 
assumption that knowledge could be considered a public-good: if this is the case, once it is 
generated it would spread throughout the economic system and the society thanks to its 
characteristics of non-rivalry and non-excludability. However, a great body of research has 
demonstrated that knowledge has both public and private components (Callon, 1994; Nelson, 
1989; Pavitt, 1987). We stress that public-generated knowledge and private-generated 
knowledge have different economic characteristics, particularly in terms of the degree of 
rivalry and excludability. This in turn shapes the diffusion process and the subsequent 
generation of knowledge and innovation. The way in which knowledge production is funded 
– public or business - does matter for subsequent application for innovation. In particular, the 
differences in: A) resources allocation; B) excludability in consumption; and C) excludability 
in production should be considered. Table 3 summarizes some fundamental differences 
between public-generated and private-generated knowledge. 
 
A. There is a great difference between public-generated and private-generated allocation of 
resources for knowledge. Indeed, one of the criteria identified by Ostrom and Ostrom (1999) 
to divide private and public goods is precisely the allocation mechanism. According to their 
classification, a good is private if the allocation mechanisms are made primarily by market 
mechanisms; by contrast, a good is public if the allocation decisions are made primarily by 
political process. According to this definition, private-generated knowledge would clearly be 
regarded as a private good.  
 
The allocation of resources for R&D is a key determinant of the possible outcome and future 
development of science. It is the allocation of resources that determines the direction of 
scientific discovery, although with some degree of uncertainty that is inherent to any 
discovery process. For instance, it is well known that “serendipity” (Gilles, 2015) is a key 
characteristic of science, especially basic science. But it is hard to get a cure for cancer by 
doing research in cosmetics, while it is more likely to get some fundamental medical 
discoveries by doing basic research on genes and cells. As a matter of fact, new anti-cancer 
therapies stemmed from federally-funded basic research into the fundamental working of 
cells in the USA (M.I.T., 2015). Nobel Laureate Arthur Kornberg put this very well: “The 
pursuit of curiosity about the basic facts of nature has proven to be the route by which the 
successful drugs and devices of modern medicine were most often discovered”.  
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Table 3 
Economic differences between private-generated and public-generated knowledge 
 
 Private-generated knowledge Public-generated knowledge 
A. 
 
Resources allocated through market 
mechanism. 
The main purpose is to contribute to profits 
though knowledge-based products, services 
and processes. 
Resources allocated through political 
process. 
The main purpose is to contribute to the 
advancement of knowledge and social 
welfare. 
B. 
Excludability in consumption pursued 
through active strategies such as industrial 
secrecy and proprietary forms of intellectual 
property. 
Non-excludability in consumption 
implemented through technology transfer 
policies and full disclosure (e.g. open 
science and non-proprietary forms of 
intellectual property). 
C. 
Excludability in production associated to 
firm-specific technical knowledge and tacit 
knowledge. 
Non-excludability in production actively 
sought reducing tacit knowledge. 
Source: Authors elaboration 
 
B. If knowledge were a pure public good, the only concern would be about the nature of the 
knowledge produced under the assumption that the business sector would direct its 
investment towards the more palatable areas for the market rather than those of greatest 
societal and scientific interest. But it would not create problems related to its social 
distribution and diffusion. However, the modern economics of science and innovation has 
rejected the idea that knowledge is a pure public good arguing that it has both private and 
public attributes (Callon, 1994; Nelson, 1989; Pavitt, 1987) and that a different balance 
occurs for each component.  
 
Accepting the Arrow-Stiglitz view implies that knowledge is strictly non-excludable, while 
most of the industrial technology is largely firm-specific and it is difficult to be used 
elsewhere (Pavitt, 1987). At best, it depends on whether the focus is on generic knowledge or 
firm-specific knowledge. In the latter cases, when knowledge is about technological 
improvements that are very specific to the firm, knowledge is closer to a private good since it 
is easier for the firm to exclude others from using it (Nelson, 1989).   
 
Economic agents may be willing to invest resources to generate knowledge only if they 
expect that they profit from it. And this leads profit-seeking agents to use technical and 
institutional devices to exclude potential users from the utilization of the knowledge they 
have generated. The literature on technological appropriation (Arundel, 2001; Cohen et al., 
2000; Levin et al., 1987) has shown that there are a variety of methods, ranging from 
intellectual property rights to industrial secrecy that firms use to protect their inventive and 
innovative activities and to prevent the dissemination to actual and prospective competitors. 
These methods are very much industry-specific and guarantee partial protection, all of which 
tries to make imitation and dissemination more costly and difficult. 
 
Therefore, there is a basic difference between the knowledge promoted by the public and the 
business sectors. While the former is generated with the purpose to be widely disseminated 
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and to be offered for use to most economic agents, the latter is financed taking into account 
that any result should be protected to make it as difficult as possible to imitate, replicate and 
disseminate it.3 Disclosure strategies work in the opposite direction. While researchers in the 
private sector keep their results as secret as possible, in the public sector researchers rush to 
disclose them to establish a priority, since the latter represents a key mechanism in public 
science to establish extra-rewards (Dasgupta and David, 1994). Since public disclosure is a 
major desirable feature of research for the society, it is easy to see that in the case of public 
research the mechanism of priority and rewards align the incentive of the scientists to that of 
the society: the larger the social impact of the research, the higher the rewards for scientists. 
 
C. Other major differences arise when one considers the role of tacit knowledge. As well-
known in every process of knowledge generation there is an explicit and a tacit component. 
While the former can be articulated and codified, the latter cannot (Cowan et al., 2000; 
Polanyi, 1966). This has great implication on the diffusion of knowledge. While explicit 
knowledge can be relatively easily transferred and re-used in different contexts, the process 
of tacit knowledge diffusion can take place only locally as it implies personal interactions. 
There are relevant differences between the public sector and the private sector to this regard. 
First, tacit knowledge is mostly associated to technical development, innovations, and 
improvements in production processes that take place within the firms. This not only reduces 
the share of codified knowledge diffused in the private sector, but also the opportunity to use 
the codified knowledge itself, since the application of such knowledge requires other tacit 
knowledge and more personal interaction (Faulkner et al., 1995). Conversely, by its very 
nature, the knowledge domain of basic research is formal (e.g. in the forms of experiments or 
computer simulations) and explicit. Results of research carried out in the public sector tend to 
be rigorously codified, as for instance into protocols or scientific articles, in order to be 
diffused, published and checked by the peer community. Second, even the tacit component of 
knowledge generated in the public sector is more likely to be diffused compared to that in the 
business sector. In fact, in the public domain researchers are continuously encouraged to 
engage in interactions thought meetings, collaborative projects, internships and other forms 
of interactions. Therefore while it is true that both the public research and private research 
produce tacit knowledge, a major difference is that business companies do not diffuse it, 
while this is deliberately done in the public sector (Pavitt, 1993).   
 
Similarities should not hide differences. There are, of course, some important similarities 
between privately-produced and publicly-produced knowledge. The fact that knowledge is 
not protected through intellectual property rights or industrial secrecy is not sufficient to 
allow users to benefit from it. From the user perspective, there is a basic difference between 
knowledge freely available from the knowledge that can be used without costs (as rightly 
noted by Callon, 1994) and this applies to both public and business funded knowledge. Even 
when the knowledge is generated by public institutions that have the best intentions to diffuse 
it, this does not mean that potential users will be able to put it into practical use without 
sustaining additional costs devoted to learning and absorbing it. All the experience of 
technology transfer schemes shows that it is not enough that there is the intention of the 
producer to transfer the knowledge (Bozeman, 2000). Successful stories require that 
prospective users invest their own time and resources to absorb it through capacity building. 
Even when it is publicly funded and freely available, it is not a free meal. 
 
                                                          
3
 It is well known for example that even if a publication of a patent should in principle allow others to replicate 
the invention, in fact, companies are quite successful in making this unlikely. 
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We also know that, in spite of all efforts made by companies to protect their knowledge with 
a mixture of industrial secrecy and intellectual property rights, it is very difficult to prevent 
competitors and the public at large to use the knowledge. The Coca-Cola receipt has been 
well kept confidential but this has not prevented competitors to bring to the market substitute 
products, and the same applies to results with a higher knowledge-base in industries such as 
pharmaceutical to ICTs. 
 
However, there is a difference in the degree of excludability between private and public 
knowledge which has enormous implications in terms of welfare when one considers a 
fundamental characteristic of learning: knowledge is that it is at the same time an output and 
the primary input for future knowledge and research. All prospective researchers and 
innovators build new knowledge on the shoulders of other previous researchers, drawing 
from the pool of knowledge that is socially available: the larger this pool of knowledge the 
greater the opportunities to explore new venues to solve.4 By contrast, if the pool of ideas that 
are publicity available is smaller, this will reduce the technological opportunity available. 
Further, this also serves as an important set of signals of where to search for finding effective 
solutions to technical problems, in that it also suggests indirectly what does not work (David, 
1997).  
 
The business sector has been itself the greater benefiter of the public pool of knowledge. 
Nelson and Rosenberg (1994) have shown that that public R&D is not a substitute to business 
R&D, but rather an enhancer of it. Both the ICT industry and the bio-tech industry, the more 
innovative and dynamic industries over the past two decades, have enormously benefited 
from basic research done in the public sector (Guellec and Potterie, 2003; Mazzucato, 2013). 
Even big companies in the pharmaceutical and biotech industries that are provided with large 
R&D labs rely heavily on the results of basic research carried out in universities and public 
research centres (D’Este et al., 2013; Lane and Probert, 2007). In these industries, the 
intensity of university-industry collaborations precisely witnesses the importance that this 
pool of knowledge in the public sector plays for private companies. 
 
The pool of publicly available knowledge affects also the direction of research. To the extent 
that the private sector succeeds in excluding some parts of the knowledge pool, researchers 
and prospective innovators will be induced to look for venues in which it is easier (and less 
costly) to have access to knowledge to build on it. This is a typical case in the bio-tech, and 
particularly in gene-based research. In this area, research has to make extensive use of 
database creation, but genes have been heavily and effectively patented. As a result, drug 
companies have been pushed away from promising line of research towards those that are 
less problematic in terms of intellectual property (Heller and Eisenberg, 1998).  
 
We have therefore learnt that: i) it is not enough that some knowledge is financed by the 
public sector to make it a pure public good, and ii) in spite of many attempts made by the 
business sector to limit the leak-out of knowledge they generated, companies do not manage 
to make it a pure private good. However, it cannot be ignored the presence of radical 
differences between the two components. Increasing the business component at the expenses 
of the public one has a simple and straightforward effect: the generation of knowledge is 
becoming more and more a competitive process where the main objectives is to exclude 
                                                          
4
 This point has been raised, interestingly enough, by Dosi and Stiglitz (2013) who define knowledge as a quasi-
public good; see also Klevorick et al. (1995). For a review on the benefits of public research see also Salter and 
Martin (2001). 
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rather than include users and this is precisely the opposite of what dominated the republic of 
science for centuries. 
3. Sectors of financing and of performance of R&D 
 
The financing of knowledge generation is not the only predictor of its public and private 
outcomes. It is possible to be more specific by taking into account also the nature of the 
organizations where this knowledge is developed. As already identified in the Frascati 
Manual (OECD, 2015), the public and the business sectors perform indoor a substantial 
amount of activities, but not all of what they fund. Since funding does not overlap entirely 
with execution, R&D expenditure is classified by the sectors of financing and of 
performance. In reality, there are significant linkages among the public and the business 
sectors that are not captured by a disjunctive classification about financing and performance. 
  
Figure 3 subdivides R&D expenditure in four main categories.
5
 In the first box we find the 
R&D financed by public sources and also performed in public institutions: it comprises what 
governments provide to universities and public labs ranging from NASA to NHS. Within the 
public sector, a further break-down between the R&D carried out in governmental research 
centres and universities can be made. In most countries, universities are public institutions, in 
a few countries they have special status (in the UK they are civil corporations), in several 
countries, including the USA and Japan, they can be both public and private. Besides the 
juridical details, universities are mostly committed to the non-commercial knowledge and 
therefore we classify their R&D expenditure as public. The fourth box reports what 
companies do with their own money. The predominant rationale to invest in R&D is to 
support products, processes and services sold in the market. Companies do it with internal 
resources as part of competitive behaviour and try to make the knowledge generated as 
excludable as possible. A large portion of this knowledge, however, generates fall-outs and 
welfare gains; business R&D creates a lot of externalities. 
 
Boxes two and three report the existence of interactions among public and business players 
that go beyond intellectual collaboration. On the one hand, the public sector often finances 
business R&D (Box 3) when it requires specific results or products which embody the 
knowledge. Cases of public procurement include government grants to business corporations 
to obtain military, space, medical or ICTs objectives. In other occasions, governments 
support the innovative activities of their companies for the positive externalities generated by 
business R&D. More often, governments support business performed R&D since this helps to 
foster their economic competitiveness, especially against foreign competitors. Conversely, 
Universities and other public research centres are more and more willing to carry out R&D 
for the business sector (Box 2). 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
5
 In fact, the OECD provides a more detailed statistical classification. The sector of financing, besides 
government and the business enterprises also includes R&D financed from abroad and from other national 
sources (comprising the non-profit sector). The sector of performance is further disaggregated in the business, 
higher education, government and private non-profit sectors. In order to obtain a two-by-two matrix which 
reflects the public-private sectors, government R&D and higher education R&D have been aggregated in table 
4. 
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Fig. 3 
R&D by sector of financing and sector of performance 
 
Source: Authors elaboration on the basis of OECD (2002). 
 
Table 4 reports the subdivision of R&D resources according to the criteria indicated in Figure 
2 for eight OECD countries for 1981 and 2012. This allows following how the composition 
of R&D expenditure has changed across different national innovation systems. 
 
Box 1 – Publicly funded and performed R&D. These resources are directly steered by public 
priorities and should correspond to the generation of pure public goods since the government 
target is to disseminate as much as possible the outcome of R&D programmes to the public at 
large and should therefore aim to remove barriers to acquire the new expertise. The landing 
on the moon in the 1960s and the war on cancer in 1970s, just to cite two major US science 
policy priorities, were mostly carried out with publicly funded and performed R&D and large 
part of the outcomes were made publicly available. 
 
Table 4 shows a drop of the share publicly funded and performed R&D in the period 1981-
2012. The decrease has occurred in Canada, France, Germany, Japan, and the US. By, 
contrast, it has remained stable in Italy and the UK. A simple average among these countries 
(excluding South Korea) indicates that the share of the public-public R&D expenditure drops 
from 37.5% to 33.1%. 
 
The reduction of the share of publicly funded and performed R&D should raise concern: the 
benefits of knowledge in the next decades will be lower and there is the risk that what the 
populace perceive as major priorities, especially in fields such as health and environment will 
get lower resources than they should be. Even in terms of sustaining business opportunities, it 
should be reminded that entire industries, including ICTs and Bio-tech, started from a few 
basic discoveries and inventions done in the public sector and that have been developed and 
commercialized, sometimes after decades, within companies (see Mazuccato, 2013). The 
scientific openings generated by public R&D have often stimulated companies to carry out 
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commercial follow-ups finalized to introduce technological innovations, thus also 
contributing to the expansion of total R&D expenditure (Rosenberg and Nelson, 1994). 
Can publicly funded and performed R&D be subtracted to the public domain and therefore 
lose some of the properties of pure public good? This depends very much from the objectives 
and strategies carried out by the government; research associated to military and security 
objectives has traditionally been kept out from the public domain. But also civilian R&D can 
be subtracted to the public domain: since the Bayh-Dole act was approved in the 1980, the 
US government has allowed individual scientists and Universities to privatize inventions 
made with public funding through IPRs. The number of patents taken by Universities has 
steadily increased, making the use of publicly funded knowledge more often excludable than 
before (Lissoni et al., 2008). 
 
After the Bayh-Dole was introduced in the USA, several other countries have imitated it 
(Grimaldi et al., 2011). The supporters of the Bayh-Dole act argue that this privatisation of 
publicly funded knowledge has increased the dissemination: by providing an additional 
incentive besides the academic glory, it is more likely that the results achieved are not kept 
sleeping, and that academic inventors actively seek opportunities to deliver the outcomes to 
the market and to society at large (Geuna and Rossi, 2011). The Bayh-Dole legislation is an 
attempt to transform inventions into innovations, to motivate academe to be more active in 
technology transfer and empirical analyses have confirmed its effectiveness. 
 
Publicly funded and performed R&D is the closest to be a pure public good. The economic 
benefits of knowledge will not be collected if it is reduced. To promote the maximum 
diffusion, actions for capacity building in prospective users should be combined to policies 
that transfer IPRs to inventors. 
Box 2 – Business funded and publicly performed R&D. It is good news when companies 
finance research in universities and public research centres. Often, companies require and 
obtain that the outcome of the R&D is kept confidential. Even if the results are non-rivalrous, 
firms can obtain that the public contractor makes them excludable, at least in the short and 
medium term. Activities following in this box belong may be beneficial to the contracting 
firm only. 
The data indicate that big money is not involved. On average, the share of this type of 
research grows from 1.5% to a modest 2%. Canada and Germany show larger increases, 
passing respectively from 1.4% to 3.7% and 0.4 and 4.2%. A moderate growth arises also in 
France, while the UK confirms a relative importance of the business as a source of funding 
for the public research sector. The US shows very low values, 0.4% in 1981 and 0.7% in 
2012 suggesting that the Silicon Valley model is a rather limited phenomenon. 
Within this component, it is possible to identify a vicious and a virtuous circle. The vicious 
circle occurs when public institutions are forced to replace the traditional sources of public 
funding with business sources. This has often been denounced because it leads public 
institutions to abandon basic research programmes to carry out testing, measurements, 
provision of standards and other very practical activities to support themselves. If 
Universities and public centres are too much obsessed with fund-raising, they can lose their 
original social function and be transformed in academic capitalist firms (Slaughter and Leslie, 
1997), impoverishing the advancement of knowledge. The virtuous circle, on the contrary, 
occurs when the business sector is attracted to the public institutions because the latter has a 
unique set of competences and has generated major scientific discoveries and advances that 
15 
 
could be used for business opportunities. However, both the critics (Slaughter and Leslie, 
1997) and the enthusiasts (Etzkowitz and Leydesdorff, 2000) of the university-business 
integration seems to largely overestimate the phenomenon. In spite of the variations across 
universities and scientific fields (Rossi and Rosli, 2015), on the aggregate business 
penetration in Universities is quantitatively rather limited. 
Box 3 – Publicly funded and business performed R&D. When the government provides 
funding to business R&D, both criteria of rivalry and excludability are blurred. In terms of 
rivalry, companies compete in order to secure the public grants and the outcome is used in a 
competitive environment. We are in a typical case where there is competition for the market 
even when there is no rivalry in consumption. Excludability is very much specific to the way 
programmes are designed: in some cases, the government requires that the outcome is kept 
confidential (as in the case of military procurement) and therefore the performing enterprise 
can exclude potential rivals from the benefits. In other cases, the government requires that the 
knowledge is properly disseminated. In both cases the performing organization has some 
advantages over competitors since it has a deeper understanding and often also lead time over 
what it originally generated. 
A generalized reduction of the public sector financing the business enterprises has occurred. 
On average (again excluding South Korea), the share drops from 11.7% in 1981 to 4.5% in 
2012. This dynamic, considered along the drop in the public-public box, reflects a 
generalized reduction in the public funding for R&D across virtually every country. The drop 
has been substantial in the US, where the share shrunk from 21.3% to 8.8%; in Germany, 
from 11.9% to 3.1%; and in France, from 15.5% to 5.6%. Part of this reflects the general 
reduction of defence expenditure at the end of the cold war. 
Why should the public sector opt to finance R&D carried out in the business sector rather 
than internally? A first justification is that the business sector is better equipped to provide 
the expected outcome. This is a justification often provided when, for example, defence-
related contracts are assigned to corporations. The second reason is that governments are not 
particularly interested in specific outcomes but wish to use R&D as an industrial policy tool 
with the aim to make companies more competitive, especially in front of foreign competitors. 
The third is that there is the hope that, if funded by the public sector, business companies will 
expand their own investment and therefore the societal investment in knowledge will be 
higher than what is provided by the government. Finally, thanks to public support companies 
should be more willing to undertake projects that otherwise would have not undertaken due to 
a high rate of risk and uncertainty, or long-term expected outcomes. To this respect public 
policy would provide additional R&D carried out in the business sector.   
The three issues need to be proven. First, if there is a problem of efficiency and efficacy in 
the publicly performed R&D, this should be addressed by revising the incentives and the 
organization of the public sector rather than by moving out of it. Second, to concentrate on 
the total amount of R&D rather than on its direction is a major mistake. Common sense 
suggests that too much scientific investigation is carried out in cosmetics while too little in 
vaccines. In the medical area, it is often denounced the distortion of scientific research 
towards areas that are more profitable rather than useful. Third, investigations about the 
effects of public funding to business R&D have provided uncertain results and in some cases 
it seems that an increase in public funding has even generated a reduction of firms’ own 
investment (Antonelli et al., 2012; David et al., 2000). 
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Table 4 
Business and public (higher education + government) share of R&D by sector of performance and source of 
funds, 1981 and 2012 (selected countries) 
CANADA
1981 2012
public business public business
public 51.0% 5.5% public 45.1% 2.3%
business 1.4% 42.1% business 3.7% 49.0%
FRANCE
1981 2012
public business public business
public 41.0% 15.5% public 33.7% 5.6%
business 0.7% 42.8% business 1.8% 59.0%
GERMANY
1981 2012
public business public business
public 30.3% 11.9% public 27.6% 3.1%
business 0.4% 57.4% business 4.2% 65.2%
ITALY
1981 2012
public business public business
public 43.4% 5.1% public 44.8% 4.4%
business 1.1% 50.4% business 1.3% 49.5%
JAPAN
1981 2012
public business public business
public 36.4% 1.2% public 21.7% 0.9%
business 0.4% 62.0% business 0.5% 76.9%
SOUTH KOREA
1995 2012
public business public business
public 19.4% 2.7% public 19.3% 4.8%
business 4.8% 73.1% business 1.5% 74.4%
UNITED STATES
1981 2012
public business public business
public 28.0% 21.3% public 26.7% 8.8%
business 0.4% 50.3% business 0.7% 63.8%
UNITED KINGDOM
1981 2012
public business public business
public 32.5% 21.2% public 32.5% 6.7%
business 3.0% 43.3% business 2.8% 58.0%
source of funds
sector of performance
source of funds
sector of performance
source of funds
sector of performance
sector of performance
source of funds
sector of performance
source of funds
sector of performance
source of funds
sector of performance
source of funds
sector of performance
source of funds
 
Source: authors’ elaboration on OECD R&D Statistics. The total amount of R&D expenditure has been 
calculated summing three main three sources of funding, namely government, higher education and the business 
sector. For South Korea data refer to 1995 instead of 1981.
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Box 4 – Business funded and performed R&D. Through their investment, the business sector 
has generated over the centuries an enormous amount of knowledge that has benefitted 
society, often contributing also to basic research (Nelson, 1959; Rosenberg, 1990). 
Transistors and semiconductors, drugs and medical devices have been generated by profit-
seeking organizations and have considerably increased well-being and development.  
Business funded and performed R&D rose from 49.8% in 1981 to 60.2% in 2012. The 
increase in the share of business-business is particularly significant in Canada, France, Japan, 
the US and the UK. The countries in which this share is larger are the two Asian economies, 
Japan and South Korea, witnessing the importance that historically private enterprises have 
played in sustaining their innovation-drive growth. Canada and Italy have a share that 
accounts for less than 50%. 
We expect that firms protect the knowledge they generate and make an effort to create some 
fences to appropriate the returns of their investment and to prevent competitors to use it 
without payment. First, companies manage to keep exclusive command of their knowledge, 
through a combination of industrial secrecy and IPRs, for limited periods of time only. 
Industrial secrets are penetrated in due course through reverse engineering, mobility of 
scientists and engineers, simultaneous discoveries and many other ways. Patents do not 
impede the possibility to invent around, and anyhow they have a limited time-span. The fact 
that most of the patents are not even renewed shows how quickly the frontier of knowledge 
moves (De Rassenfosse et al., 2013). Of course, the disclosure of information is not enough 
to allow competitors to put into practice the knowledge available: they will need to invest 
their own time and resources to do that successfully. But the fences available to firms to 
protect their own intellectual property are much weaker than those of any other form of 
property. 
Second, in order to sustain their knowledge base, firms need to acquire information from a 
variety of sources, public and commercial. Failure to do that may lead to put into production 
obsolete, misleading or sub-optimal knowledge. In order to acquire information, firms also 
need to share knowledge with others. The evidence on strategic technological agreements 
shows that companies share and even develop core competences with competitors (Narula 
and Martinez-Noya, 2015). Moreover, even the individual scientists and engineers within 
companies are often part of circles of experts where information is exchanged on a voluntary 
basis and following the standard of communication typical of the academic community (von 
Hippel, 1987). The open innovation model, which has become so popular over the last 
decade, has clearly indicated that the sources to innovate are varied and that it is not in the 
interest of an enterprise to keep its knowledge development segregated from the wider realm 
of knowledge (Chesbrough et al., 2008). 
These facts have important policy implications. The public sector could considerably concur 
to increase the knowledge generation of the business sector by producing good and accessible 
knowledge which could be used by businesses in a competitive environment. The necessity of 
the business sector to share and exchange knowledge with other knowledge-intensive sectors 
and even with competitors, need to be further enhanced through public policies. It would, for 
example, suggests that rather than to provide public funding to individual firms (distorting 
competition), the public sector would better devote its resources to promote open centres, 
such as science parks, where all knowledge intensive players, business and private, could 
exchange the knowledge at their disposal. 
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4. Three implications 
 
Using the public goods framework and the OECD classification of sector of funding and 
execution has allowed highlighting some trends that have often been ignored in recent 
science and innovation policy analysis. This has some implications also some of the recent 
theorizing about innovation. 
 
Interactions are good, but the institutional nature of players should be preserved. The 
emphasis that the economics of science and technology has put for the last twenty years on 
the interactions (using often a large number of terms such as: networks, clusters, 
public/private partnerships, milieu and others), should not hide the fact that public and 
business players have different incentive mechanisms and priorities which should be 
preserved. The changing composition of R&D expenditure provoked by the retreat of the 
public sphere on the one hand and the growth of business investment on the other hand, has 
already generated and will continue to generate long term consequences in the republic of 
knowledge. It should therefore be reaffirmed the idea that the main purpose of the public 
sector is to promote and disseminate good knowledge addressing socially relevant issues. 
Interactions cannot by themselves be a substitute for public funding. Once this basic principle 
is affirmed, interactions with the business world are welcomed, especially if they are 
designed to enhance the societal priorities dictated by the government. In fact, personal 
collaboration has been recognized as a major channel of knowledge transfer between 
universities and companies (Economic Insight, 2015). 
 
R&D data show a clear pattern: the bulk of the research is both funded and performed either 
in the public or in the private sector, while the cross-funding between them is scarce and 
declined. Inasmuch as who puts the money decides the priorities, this result is consistent with 
our normative view that the priorities of the public and business sector should be kept 
separated. We are not claiming that university and industry should not collaborate. Quite the 
contrary, the fact that the business sector is massively investing in R&D creates the ideal 
conditions for the industry itself to be able to absorb and benefit by collaborating with the 
public research and by technology transfer. It is in fact well know that R&D carried out in the 
private sector is a necessary condition to interact and learn from the basic research conducted 
in universities (Cohen and Levinthal, 1990; Pavitt, 1993).  
 
Therefore, reducing the public funding to basic research will ultimately also reduce the 
returns for the industry itself. This has to be taken into account when great emphasis is put on 
the argument that applied research or market-let research is important to fuel countries’ 
competitiveness. While this can be true in the short run, a generalized reduction of basic 
research will eventually impoverish the sources of competitiveness of the industry. The 
current trend about the shrinking of public R&D can hence have major negative impact also 
on countries’ dynamic efficiency. The dominance of China in the renewable energy 
technology sector is a case in point. In a few years, China has become the world leader in this 
sector boosted by massive investment in research funded by the public sector. Today, out of 
fifteen public research centres across the world, nine are Chinese, with the Chinese Academy 
of Sciences featuring as the world’s number one public centre (KIK Innoenergy, 2015). 
Further, public funding to the private sector has often generated concerns for antitrust 
policies. Close relationship between the public and private sector can in fact create a number 
of problems both in terms of antitrust policies, but also in terms of possible moral hazard and 
other forms of opportunistic behaviours. A final comment concerns the crowding-in or 
crowding-out effects of public funded research on private research: the more government 
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funds public research close to the market, the higher the risk of a crowding-out effect on 
business R&D. By contrast, funding public pure research is more likely to lead to crowding-
in effect, thus maximising the economic benefits stemming from the complementarity 
between public and private research. 
 
Back to the linear model? – The considerations made above may lead to revaluate the linear 
model of innovation, which was so influential in the 1950s and 1960s. According to this 
model, there were logical links between the initial stages of knowledge development, mostly 
carried out by Universities and other public centres in the form of basic research, and the 
final stages of commercialization, carried out by profit-seeking companies (Kline and 
Rosenberg, 1986). This model is too schematic to guide science policy and, inasmuch as 
business innovation is concerned, has been replaced with models that privilege interactions at 
different stages of the knowledge-chain and across the various players. When addressing the 
SPRU 25
th
 anniversary Conference, Nathan Rosenberg (1991) proudly declared that “the 
linear model is death”, and for sure the audience he was lecturing (and Rosenberg himself) 
contributed to go beyond a rigid notion of how innovation develops. Nearly a quarter of a 
century has passed since this seminal conference. Over this period, much evidence has been 
produced on the relevance of loops, interactions, connections and feed-backs from the 
different stages of knowledge development (Caraça et al., 2009). 
 
But the overemphasis on the importance of loops and the corresponding belittlement of the 
linear model (Balconi et al., 2010) also had the consequence of neglecting the trend we have 
singled out above. Short-termism has contaminated also the republic of knowledge that, by 
definition, provides its best outcome when is long-sighted. 
 
Knowledge in the global arena – We have, so far, discussed the issue with reference to 
individual nations. But, of course, global interactions are the norm in the realm of knowledge 
(Archibugi and Filippetti, 2015a). Academe always had the propensity to share knowledge 
across borders and formal and informal contacts among scholars working in the same issues 
have been the norm (Heitor, 2015; Hennemann and Liefner, 2015). Over the last decades 
similar trends have occurred also within the business community (Cantwell and Molero, 
2003; Iammarino and McCann, 2013, 2015). R&D intensive companies have increased their 
propensity to locate their facilities in more than one country, creating intra-firm but inter-
national networks. International strategic technology agreements have dramatically increased 
since the 1980s showing that companies are more willing than generally expected to share 
their know-how with competitors (Narula and Martinez-Noya, 2015). 
In a world of blurred frontiers and where the national dimension of individual companies is 
more and more identifiable, governments should seriously re-think also their industrial policy 
based on innovation incentives. The more convincing strategy seems to enhance the 
capabilities within their territories, upgrading R&D infrastructures and training of qualified 
personnel. In their investment decisions, companies seem to be more attracted by these local 
capabilities than by cash incentives.  
 
Governments would carry out their function much better through public international 
cooperation programmes rather than by supporting companies, especially if they are directed 
to pre-competitive R&D that could deliver global social benefits. An excellent example is the 
World Health Organization programme to eradicate small-pox (Fenner et al., 1988). The 
programme cost was rather moderate (about 300 million US dollars), it helped to eradicate a 
disease in developing as well as developed countries and contributed to create medical 
infrastructures in countries that desperately needed them. Such a programme took place 
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between 1967 and 1980 and it is sad to note that in the last 35 years it is difficult to find 
another comparable and successful programme aimed to generate comparable knowledge-
based global public goods. 
5. Discussion and conclusions 
 
This article has discussed a series of facts that are not sufficiently addressed in science and 
technology policy: the public component of research has been reduced, while the business 
component is flourishing. On the ground of an analytical distinction which identifies the 
economic characteristics of knowledge produced in the public sector and knowledge 
produced in the private sector, we have explained why this trend might generate long-term 
adverse consequences. First of all, because there is no guarantee that market-led opportunities 
correspond to societal needs and priorities. Second, because an excessive privatisation of 
knowledge reduces the possibilities of diffusing knowledge. Third, because long-term 
technological opportunities, especially when they are radical, are often associated to major 
scientific break-troughs generated by basic research carried out in public institutions. This 
has happened with electricity and chemicals, ICTs and pharmaceuticals, the global 
positioning system and the internet, and there is no specific reasons why this should not be 
happening again, provided governments are willing to properly support public research. 
 
Our analysis covers a long span of time in which major changes have occurred in the way in 
which research is carried out and in the role of knowledge in contemporary societies. 
Knowledge has become the main engine of economic competitiveness of both states and 
companies, and, as a result, R&D represents the main source of comparative advantage. 
Looking at the data for 1981 and 2013 we are comparing two different worlds. The Triple 
Helix studies suggested that the real of knowledge has gone through major changes and that 
universities, industries, and governments had greater interactions among them (Leydesdorff 
and Etzkowitz, 1996). To what extent is this reflected in data on R&D? In principle, this 
should be evident by looking at our hybrid boxes (see figure 3, box 2 and 3) where the 
business sector and the public sector (both universities and governments) are financing the 
research expenditure of each other. However, it arises that the share of R&D expenditure 
financed by the private sector and performance by the public sector is still negligible. Further, 
the share of R&D expenditure financed by the public sector and performed in the industry has 
shrunk considerably. If the interactions envisaged by the aforementioned studies are that 
relevant, they could be only in collaboration which do not imply cross-financing between the 
public sector and the business sector.  
 
A great shift in the realm of the production of knowledge was already anticipated and 
advocated, among others, by Gibbons et al. (1994). They claimed that a new mode of 
knowledge generation is increasingly produced close to the context of application. The 
business sector has a key role here in consequence of the intensification of international 
competition. In this sense, the trend about the relative decline of public research that we have 
outlined here was already predicted. In a rather explicit language, Gibbons et al. argued that 
“this transformation is one of the more far-reaching […] because it involves drawing the 
universities into the heart of the commercial process” (Gibbons et al., 1994, p. 86). According 
to this view, the increased pressure of social accountability of publicly-financed scientific 
research has encouraged to move from curiosity-driven research on fundamental principles 
towards research closer to the context of application. This has changed the setting of research 
priorities that are, according to the authors, more adherent to social needs in terms of having 
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greater wealth potential and greater impact on countries’ competitiveness. This conclusion 
seems to be at odd with our claim about the risk that the shift towards the privatization of 
knowledge bears precisely on setting priorities that are less desirable from a social welfare 
standpoint.  
 
Two comments are in order here. The first is that shifting the research priorities from 
fundamental knowledge towards more applied context does not necessarily generate higher 
wealth creation and long-term economic growth. Concerns about the slowdown of innovation 
and technological progress have been raised recently, among the others, by Robert Gordon’s 
work (2010). In his influential book, Tyler Cowen (2002) argues that in the early 20th 
century there were many “low hanging fruits” for the world economy to collect such as 
antibiotics, electricity-powered factories, radio, TV, planes and automobiles. But these have 
all been exploited. As we run out of low hanging fruit, the argument goes, we are likely to 
run out of rapid technological progress and growth will slow down. Crucially, most of these 
hanging fruits have been the results of major break-through in basic research. In fact, 
fundamental research carried out in public bodies is still delivering substantial technological 
innovation to the business sector. A recent research on the European Laboratory for Particle 
Physics (CERN) shows a great impact of CERN over technological innovation in the 
business sectors across the most disparate industries, from medicine to electronics, including 
technologies for cancer therapy, photovoltaic cells, and x-ray (Le Goff, 2011). 
 
The second comment is that social accountability can be defined in different ways. Gibbons 
et al. (1994) seem to interpret this in terms of activity that generate higher economic payoff, 
for example by rising competitiveness and economic growth. Others would leave the choice 
to the market, trusting that “The market place does not worship false idols, it makes 
empirically correct judgments” (Kealey, 1996, pp. 344–45). We instead see social 
accountability more in terms of the process of priority setting. In our view fundamental 
public research has a better bearing on social desirability when the priorities are set through a 
political process, which, ultimately, has to be accountable to the society within the 
democratic process. 
 
According to the collaborative science argument, we are witnessing a paramount paradigm 
shift in the way science is carried out (Nielsen, 2012). The major driver is the World Wide 
Web that is making possible to connect not only scientists, but also amateur citizens, that can 
contribute to substantial advancements in science thanks to an unprecedented mass of data 
and a distributed and amplified form of collective intelligence. A crucial factor to unleash the 
potential of this new pattern of collaborative science is the possibility to make an increasing 
mass of information (e.g. big data, measurements, results of experiments, etc.) freely 
available and accessible across the whole world. Here the possibility to spread knowledge 
and information at a cost close to zero is the condition sine qua non for further encouraging 
the democratization of science, while the presence of proprietary forms of IPRs can act as a 
deterrent (David, 2004).The risk of a privatization of knowledge and information, or a 
“Second Enclosure Movement” has been also discussed with relation to knowledge-as-a-
common view, actually by another Nobel Prize winner, namely Elinor Ostrom together with 
other scholars (Boyle, 2003; Hess and Ostrom, 2006). These studies focus on the accessibility 
characteristic of knowledge as a common, in particular claiming the presence of new risks 
associated to new technologies that can enable the capture of what were once free and open 
public goods. We have outlined a similar risk in relation to private-generated knowledge that 
puts in place a number of strategies to artificially increase the excludability of knowledge. 
We share the same policy concern: public policy should refrain to use intellectual property in 
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these cases, while it should instead encourage open science through the creation of public 
open platform to share basic information, such as for example data and basic knowledge. 
 
This discussion is also related to the much heated current debate on the financing of basic 
research. A techno-libertarian view, recently exemplified by Matt Ridley (2015), argues that 
innovation is not the result of basic science; quite the contrary, advancements in 
technological applications close to the market drive research in basic science: “Deep 
scientific insights are the fruits that fall from the tree of technological change”. If this was the 
case, there would be no scope for government intervention to support innovation; at best, 
“they can only make sure that they don’t hinder it” (Ridley, 2015) since the industry could do 
it better itself. An opposite view will on the contrary defend the need of a republic of 
knowledge and, on the ground of a whole bunch of historical examples, stresses that basic 
science is indeed crucial for technological developments (David, 1997; Mazzucato, 2013). 
We have here argued that it makes a great difference if basic science is carried out in the 
public sector or by business companies and that this has profound impact on the long-term 
rate of innovation, economic growth and social welfare.   
 
We are not blind in front of the several problems that is facing publicly funded and performed 
R&D. There is a traditional propensity of academia to close itself into the Ivory Tower and to 
ignore economic and social life. These issues should be addressed and there is room, through 
a revision of the incentives and the organization of scientific research, to improve the current 
situation. But the retreat of the public from the real of knowledge is not the solution; on the 
contrary it is aggravating the problem because it forces universities and research centres to 
please the market, something they are not very good at, while making more difficult what 
they should be able to do at best, namely to generate good and useful knowledge accessible to 
all society. 
 
We are also aware that promoting public research for industrial competitiveness is easier to 
sell from policy makers, especially in periods of dire financial straits, also as a consequence 
of the recent economic crisis.
6
 The support for public R&D by means of taxpayers’ money is 
a delicate matter, since it includes a sacrifice today for future and uncertain benefits, mostly 
accruing to citizens indirectly. This issue is explicit in the recent emphasis on the impact for 
the society that researchers applying for a research grant of the European Commission should 
be able to strictly demonstrate. However, it is also true that bad times can represent good 
windows of opportunities to pursue substantial political shifts (Drazen and Grilli, 1993). 
 
There is great scope for future research, both quantitative and qualitative, both to delve into 
the quantitative shift of research as well as major changes in the nature of research carried out 
for the public interest. In a world in which Google is carrying out research on artificial 
intelligence and biotechnologies, large NGOs like the Bill and Melinda Foundation funds 
research on vaccines and HIV to improve health conditions in developing countries, there is a 
lot to do to study the positive economics of public research as well as the normative 
prescriptions of science policy. We hope to have contributed to shed some light on a major 
trend that has occurred over the past three decades which has to be taken into account in 
designing appropriate science, technology and innovation policies.  
 
 
 
                                                          
6
 In fact both public and private R&D have been reduced as a result of the crisis (Filippetti and Archibugi 2011). 
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